We introduce the notion of an antichain-convex set to extend Debreu (1954)'s version of the second welfare theorem to economies where either the aggregate production set or preference relations are not convex. We show that-possibly after some redistribution of individuals' wealth-the Pareto optima of some economies which are marked by certain types of non-convexities can be spontaneously obtained as valuation quasi-equilibria and equilibria: both equilibrium notions are to be understood in Debreu (1954)'s sense. From a purely structural point of view, the mathematical contribution of this work is the study of the conditions that guarantee the convexity of the Minkowski sum of …nitely many possibly non-convex sets. Such a study allows us to obtain a version of the MinkowskinHahn-Banach separation theorem which dispenses with the convexity of the sets to be separated and which can be naturally applied in standard proofs of the second welfare theorem; in addition-and equally importantly-the study allows to get a deeper understanding of the conditions on the single production sets of an economy that guarantee the convexity of their aggregate.
Introduction
The second welfare theorems enunciated in Debreu (1951 Debreu ( , 1954 and Arrow (1951) are-more or less explicitly-proved by means of the so-called Minkowski and Hahn-Banach separation theorems. The economic thesis of their welfare theorems is that, possibly after some redistribution of individuals'wealth, the Pareto optima of convex economies 1 can be spontaneously obtained as competitive equilibria of an economy with a …nite set of agents where consumers choose optimal a¤ordable consumption vectors and …rms maximize own pro…ts. The convexity enables the applications of the mentioned separation theorems but is known to be liable to objection. However, if such a condition were simply dropped then the previous thesis would not hold anymore in general.
Motivated by the need of relaxing the convexity requisites of an economy, in the seventies Guesnerie (1975) extended the second welfare theorem to nonconvex preferences and technologies: his extension pertained the …rst-order necessary conditions for consumers' expenditure minimization and …rms' pro…t maximization. In convex economies the necessary conditions are also su¢ -cient to guarantee that a Pareto optimum is the solution to such optimization problems; but the su¢ ciency is not generally guaranteed without convexity assumptions and hence a Pareto optimum of a non-convex economy need not be supportable as a valuation quasiequilibrium. The main results concerning the extension of the second welfare to non-convex economies followed the pioneering approach of Guesnerie (1975) : they were devoted to …nding "marginal" prices at Pareto optima which-satisfying the …rst-order necessary conditions-lie in suitably chosen normal cones. Much e¤ort within this literature has been made to seek the right notion of a tangent cone (and of its corresponding normal cone). Among the articles of this strand of the literature we mention in particular Khan and Vohra (1987,1988) , Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988) , Khan (1999) , Mordukhovich (2000) , Bonnisseau (2002) , Florenzano et al. (2006) , Jofré and Rivera (2006) , Habte and Mordukhovich (2011) .
It is important to observe that Debreu (1954) 's second welfare theorem does not posit the convexity of production sets but only that of their aggregate. As the …nite sum of convex sets is convex, that second welfare theorem holds for convex economies: this is undisputed. On the other hand one can easily construct speci…c examples of economies with a convex aggregate production sets where at least one …rm has a non-convex production set. Therefore Debreu (1954) 's economies are not convex stricto sensu and hence the second welfare theorem stated therein holds even for some non-convex economies. However, one is left in the dark when trying to …gure out which (general) conditions on …rms' production sets can guarantee the convexity of their aggregate in nonconvex economies. To the best of our knowledge, the subsequent literature has not illuminated this issue which, from a mathematical viewpoint, boils down to understanding which properties-other than convexity-guarantee that the sum of a …nite family of sets is convex.
The previous observation on Debreu (1954) 's assumptions is made more accurate when noting that the condition which, in fact, plays a role in the proof of Debreu (1954) 's second welfare theorem is the convexity of the Pareto 1 An economy is convex if all preference relations and all production sets are convex.
2 improving set Z of scarce resources. 2 The set Z is the sum of the aggregate production set and a certain Pareto improving set of aggregate consumption vectors: thus Z is the Minkowski sum of two Minkowski sums. Its convexity condition is well-known to be met in convex economies. But what can we say as for non-convex economies? Once again one runs into the key issue of seeking conditions ensuring the convexity of the sum of …nitely many (possibly nonconvex) sets.
In this paper we tackle the issue of extending the second welfare theorem to non-convex economies by applying a reformulation of the MinkowskinHahnBanach theorem that dispenses with convexity assumptions on sets separated by a linear continuous functional. In the same spirit of Debreu (1954) , we provide su¢ cient conditions for the supportability of Pareto optima as valuation quasiequilibria and as valuation equilibria. But unlike Debreu (1954) , we do not assume the convexity of both the aggregate production set and the preference relations of an economy. Various alternative versions of the second welfare theorem will be presented: one of them-more precisely our Theorem 6-properly generalizes Theorem 2 of Debreu (1954) on the supportability of Pareto optima as valuation quasiequilibria in the case of an economy with locally nonsatiated preferences. Some versions-like for instance our Theorem 7-are not stricto sensu comparable to Theorem 2 of Debreu (1954) but nevertheless explicitly display conditions on (possibly non-convex) production sets which ensure the convexity of their aggregate.
Our reformulation of the MinkowskinHahn-Banach theorem-more precisely our Theorem 4-relies on a notion of generalized convexity introduced in Ceparano and Quartieri (2017) which is here extended to arbitrary cones and to a possibly in…nite-dimensional setting. Such a notion is here called C-antichainconvexity and impose the usual notion of convexity requisites only on the linear span of any two vectors whose di¤erences do not belong to some …xed cone C. To obtain the desired reformulation, we preliminarily address the problem of establishing which conditions can guarantee the convexity of the Minkowski sum of …nitely many sets when some summands are not convex. One of the results of this work-more precisely our Theorem 1-displays these conditions proving that the sum of …nitely many sets is convex when each summand is Cantichain-convex and at least one of them is C-upward (which is a sort general free-disposability condition). 3 From the pure point of view of the mathematical structure that underlies the economic results of this work, this result is perhaps our key-contribution.
The paper is tacitly organized into two parts. The …rst part is merely mathematical and consists of Sect. 2-4 and Appendix A. Sect. 2 presents the mathematical de…nitions of a C-antichain-convex and of a C-upward sets and illustrate some of their general properties. Sect. 3 shows that the sum of …nitely many C-antichain-convex sets is convex provided one of the summands is C-upward.
Sect. 4 uses this last result to obtain a separation theorem which applies also to non-convex sets. Appendix A contains some mathematical facts. The second part-where the results of the …rst are applied-is of economic nature and consists of Sect. 5-8 and Appendices B-C. Sect. 5 recalls some classical economic notions and de…nitions. Sect. 6 provides several second theorems of welfare for possibly non-convex economies. Sect. 5 contains a discussion of the hypotheses posited in the second welfare theorems . Sect. 8 shows some concluding corollaries and some examples of non-convex economies where the economic results of the paper apply. Appendix B contains some economic facts and Appendix C examines the representability of C-antichain-convex preferences by means of C-antichain-quasiconcave (utility) functions.
Fundamental mathematical notions
Hereafter a real vector space-i.e., a vector space over the reals-is sometimes abbreviated by RVS and a topological real vector space-i.e., a topological vector space over the reals-by TRVS.
4 A subset C of a RVS is a cone i¤
Under our de…nition a cone can be empty; however, a cone need not be convex or contain the zero vector. Given a …nite nonempty subset S = fs 1 ; : : : ; s k g of a RVS, we respectively denote by co(S) and coni(S) the convex hull of S and the convex conical hull of S de…ned by co(S) = f 1 s 1 + : : : + k s k : ( 1 ; : : : ; k ) 2 R k + and 1 + : : :
and coni(S) = f 1 s 1 + : : : (S) . When V is a RVS and S is a subset of V , we denote by S the complement of S to V . Notation 1 Given two points x and y of a RVS and a real , the expression x h i y will henceforth denote the a¢ ne combination x + (1 )y.
The notion of "chain-convexity"…rstly introduced in Ceparano and Quartieri (2017) is now generalized to arbitrary real vector spaces and cones.
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De…nition 1 Let V be a RVS and S be a subset of V . Let C be a cone in V . 4 These de…nitions can be found, e.g., in Kelley and Namioka (1963, pp. 1-2 and 34) . We recall that the topology of a TRVS is translation invariant. 5 The de…nition of a "chain-convex set" provided in the mentioned paper coincides with that of a C-chain-convex set-in the sense of De…nition 1-when V = R n and C = R n + .
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S is said to be C-chain-convex i¤ (x; y; ) 2 S S [0; 1] and y x 2 C ) x h i y 2 S.
S is said to be C-antichain-convex i¤
De…nition 2 Let V be a RVS and C be a cone in V . A subset S of V is decomposably C-antichain-convex i¤ S can be expressed as the Minkowski sum of …nitely many C-antichain-convex subsets of V .
b. The discrete sets f0g N + and f0g N + are C-antichain-convex.
+ is the sum of the C-antichain-convex sets N + f0g and f0g N + ).
In fact C-antichain-convexity can be recovered from C-chain-convexity and vice versa; in a sense, however, the two notions are complementary of one another with respect to convexity. Propositions 1 and 2-proved in Appendix A.2-clarify the point with a precise statement. Proposition 3-whose elementary proof is omitted-highlights some implications of De…nition 1 which are worth to be remarked. Proposition 4-proved in Appendix A.2-clari…es that C-antichain-convex decomposability generalizes C-antichain-convexity.
Proposition 1 Let V be a RVS, S be a subset of V and C be a cone in V .
S is C-antichain-convex if and only if
S is C [ C-chain-convex.
S is C-chain-convex if and only if
Proposition 2 Let V be a RVS, S be a subset of V and C be a cone in V . Then S is convex if and only if S is C-chain-convex and C-antichain-convex.
Proposition 3 Let V be a RVS and S be a subset of V . Suppose C and C are cones in V such that ; C C V .
1. S is ;-chain-convex.
S is convex if and only if
5. S is convex if and only if S is ;-antichain-convex.
Remark 1 Proposition 3 continues to hold true if one replaces ";" with "f0g" in its parts 1 and 5 and "V " with "V nf0g" in its parts 2 and 4.
Proposition 4 Let V be a RVS, S be a subset of V and C be a cone in V . If S is C-antichain-convex then S is decomposably C-antichain-convex.
In a same vein we rede…ne the notions of upward and downward sets.
De…nition 3 Let V be a RVS and S be a subset of V . Let C be a cone in V .
S is said to be C-upward i¤
S is said to be C-downward i¤
Proposition 5-proved in Appendix A.3-clari…es that the two notions just introduced are special cases of C-chain-convexity. Proposition 6-whose elementary proof is omitted-highlights some implications of De…nition 3 which are worth to be explicitly remarked.
Proposition 5 Let V be a RVS, S be a subset of V and C be a cone in V .
Proposition 6 Let V be a RVS, S be a subset of V and C be a cone in V . Suppose C and C are cones in V such that ; C C V .
1. S is ;-upward.
Remark 2 Proposition 6 continues to hold true if one replaces ";"with "f0g"in its parts 1 and 3.
3 On the convex sum of sets
The sum of two C-antichain-convex sets need not be C-antichain-convex. 6 However, if one of the addends is either C-upward or C-downward then their sum is C-antichain-convex: in fact even convex.
Theorem 1 Let V be a RVS and C be a cone in V . Let X,Y be C-antichainconvex subsets of V .
1. If X is C-upward then X + Y is convex and C-upward.
2. If X is C-downward then X + Y is convex and C-downward.
Proof. 1. Suppose X is C-upward. Propositions 2 and 5 ensure that X is convex. By part 1 of Lemma 1, part 2 of Lemma 3 and part 1 of Lemma 4-all contained in Appendix A-we can assume without loss of generality that 0 2 C. Part 1 of Proposition 7 ensures that X + Y is C-upward. Pick an arbitrary
Then there exists (x ; x ; y ; y ) 2 X X Y Y such that v = x + y and v = x + y .
As X is convex, x h i x 2 X. Therefore
and
The proof continues distinguishing three exhaustive cases.
Then y h i y 2 Y by the C-antichainconvexity of Y and hence
Case 2. Suppose y y 2 C. Then (1 )(y y ) 2 C as the cone C contains 0. Since (1 )(y y ) 2 C and X + Y is C-upward, from (5) and part 3 of Lemma 5-in Appendix A-we infer that
6 Even the sum of a C-antichain-convex set and a convex set need not be C-antichain-convex (and a fortiori convex): for instance, putting C = R 2 + , one readily veri…es that the subsets f(0; 0); (0; 1)g and [0; 1] f0g of R 2 are both C-antichain-convex and the latter is even convex but their (decomposably C-antichain-convex) sum [0; 1] f0; 1g is not C-antichain-convex.
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Case 3. Suppose y y 2 C. Then y y 2 C and (y y ) 2 C as the cone C contains 0. Since (y y ) 2 C and X + Y is C-upward, from (6) and part 3 of Lemma 5-in Appendix A-we infer that
In each of the three cases v h i v 2 X + Y and so part 1 of Theorem 1 is true. 2. Suppose X is C-downward. Then part 6 of Lemma 3 and part 4 of Lemma 4-both contained in Appendix A-respectively guarantee that the sets X and Y are C-antichain-convex and that X is C-upward. Then part 1 of Theorem 1 implies the convexity of ( X) + ( Y ). Therefore also X + Y is convex. Part 2 of Proposition 7 ensures that X + Y is C-downward.
The previous result can be conveniently generalized as follows.
Corollary 1 Let V be a RVS and C be a cone in V . Assume that the subsets X 1 ; : : : ; X m of V are C-antichain-convex.
1. If X 1 is C-upward then X 1 + : : : + X m is convex and C-upward.
2. If X 1 is C-downward then X 1 + : : : + X m is convex and C-downward.
Proof. When m = 1, Corollary 1 follows from Propositions 2 and 5. A convex subset of V is C-antichain-convex by Proposition 2: noted this fact one readily proves by induction the case m 2 using Theorem 1.
4 On the separation of sets
Known results
Let V denote a RVS and V 0 denote the algebraic dual (i.e., the set of all realvalued linear functions on V ). We say that a linear functional h 2 V 0 separates two subsets X and
and h is non-zero (i.e., h(v) 6 = 0 for some v 2 V ). So the linear functional h separates X and Y if and only if h separates Y and X and the linear functional h separates X and Y if and only if h separates Y and X. We have adopted the previous de…nition of separation-where the order of the sets matters-for expositional simplicity. Clari…ed this, we recall a known geometric form of the Hahn-Banach theorem. 2. If either X or Y has nonempty interior then X and Y can be separated by a continuous linear functional on V .
7 For a proof of Theorem 2 see, e.g., Theorem 14.2 in Kelley and Namioka (1963) and Theorem 7.30 in Aliprantis and Border (2006) . About part 1-i.e., the Minkowski separation theorem-recall that every linear functional on a …nite-dimensional TRVS is continuous.
Observation Let V be a RVS and h 2 V 0 and let X and Y be subsets of V : (i) the sets X and Y are disjoint if and only if so are X Y and f0g; (ii) the sets X and Y are separated by h if and only if so are X Y and f0g.
In the light of the previous Observation, Theorem 2 can be restated thus.
Theorem 3 (Separation Theorem II) Let V be a TRVS. Assume that X and Y are nonempty subsets of V such that X Y is convex. Suppose X and Y are disjoint.
1. If V is …nite-dimensional then X and Y can be separated by a continuous linear functional on V .
2. If X Y has nonempty interior then X and Y can be separated by a continuous linear functional on V .
A reformulation
Theorems 2 and 3 are essentially the restatement of one another. This does not mean that they are perfectly equivalent: Theorem 3 can directly apply when Theorem 2 cannot. Such a direct application, however, is possible only when X Y is known to be convex. To the best of our knowledge, there do not exist general results that guarantee the convexity of the Minkowski sum of two sets when either of them is not convex. So Theorem 1-and its Corollary 1-can be used to obtain reformulations of Theorem 3 which explicitly dispense with the convexity of either X or Y . One of the possible reformulations is as follows.
Theorem 4 (Separation Theorem III) Let V be a TRVS and C be a cone in V . Assume that X 1 ,. . . ,X m ,Y 1 ,. . . ,Y n are C-antichain-convex subsets of V and that at least one of such m + n sets is either C-upward or C-downward. Put
Suppose X and Y are disjoint.
Proof. By assumption, one of the m + n sets
Thus by parts 3 and 4 of Lemma 4-in Appendix A-one of the m + n sets
. . , Y n is C-antichainconvex and by part 6 of Lemma 3-in Appendix A-the set Y l is C-antichainconvex for all l = 1; : : : ; n. Then Corollary 1 guarantees that the Minkowski sum X Y of the m + n sets X 1 , . . . , X m , Y 1 , . . . , Y n is convex. Noted this, Theorem 3 applies and ensures the validity of Theorem 4.
Remark 3 It should be clear from part 5 of Proposition 3, parts 1 and 3 of Proposition 6 and Remarks 1 and 2 that Theorem 4 has the same hypotheses and theses of Theorem 2 if m = n = 1 and C f0g and if, in its part 2, it is additionally supposed that either X or Y has nonempty interior (this last condition is stronger than the nonemptiness of the interior of X Y ). Thus Theorem 4 subsumes Theorem 2.
Positivity of the separating functional
Theorem 5 Let V be a RVS and C be a cone in V . Assume that X and Y are nonempty subsets of V separated by a linear functional h :
Proof. Suppose X is C-upward. The assumption that X and Y are separated by h entails the existence of a real r such that
Now, by way of contradiction, suppose there exists c 2 C such that h( c) < 0.
Pick some x 2 X and put t = (r h( x))=h( c). As X is C-upward, part 1 of Lemma 5-in Appendix A-ensures that x + C X. Then the assumption that C is a cone containing c entails that
But h is linear and negative at c and therefore h( x + t c) = h( x) + th( c) < r for all positive t > t: a contradiction with (7) and (8).
Corollary 2 Let V be a TRVS and C be a cone in V . Assume that X and Y are nonempty subsets of V separated by a linear functional h : V ! R. Besides assume that either X is C-upward or Y is C-downward. Then h is nonnegative on C and positive on the interior of C. 
De…nition of an economy
An economy E is a quintuple
with a …nite nonempty set M = f1; : : : ; mg whose elements are called consumers and a …nite nonempty set N = f1; : : : ; ng whose elements are called …rms. Each consumer i 2 M is described by a nonempty consumption set X i , by a preference relation R i X i X i and by an endowment ! i 2 X i . Each …rm l 2 N is described by a nonempty production set Y l . All consumption and production sets are subsets of a commodity space V which is assumed to be a topological real vector space containing a-possibly empty and possibly not convex-cone C called the relational commodity subspace.
The cone C induces a binary relation @ on V de…ned by the double implication y x 2 C , x @ y: if C is a convex cone such that 0 2 C (resp. such that C \ C = f0g) then @ is a preorder relation (resp. a partial order relation). As usual, the set of all real-valued linear functions on V is denoted by
Let E be an economy and i 2 M be a consumer. The set
is called the strict preference relation for consumer i and denoted by P i . is the set of attainable allocations and the set X A = fx 2 X : (x; y) 2 A for some y 2 Yg is the set of attainable consumption allocations. The set of attainable consumption allocations Pareto dominating x 2 X A is
The set of consumption allocations weakly improving x 2 X is
De…nition 4 Let E be an economy. A strict preference relation P i is:
De…nition 5 Let E be an economy. A strict preference relation P i is convex i¤ P i (x i ) is convex for all x i 2 X i .
De…nition 6 Let E be an economy. A preference relation R i is:
De…nition 7 Let E be an economy. A strict preference relation P i is:
locally nonsatiated i¤ P i (x i ) \ U 6 = ; for all neighborhoods U of x i and for all x i 2 X i (neighborhoods are understood w.r.t. the topology of V );
is endowed with the relative topology from R).
De…nition 8 An economy E is regular i¤ i) each consumption set X i is convex;
ii) each preference relation R i is a preorder;
iii) each strict preference relation P i is locally nonsatiated; iv) at least one strict preference relation P i is wide when both int(Y ) is empty and V is not …nite-dimensional.
De…nition 9 A regular economy E is a strictly regular economy i¤ i) each X i and each Y l contain 0;
ii) each P i is D-lower semicontinuous.
De…nition 10 Let E be an economy. A pair ( x; y) 2 X Y is a Pareto optimum for E i¤ (i) ( x; y) 2 A and (ii) D( x) = ;.
De…nition 11 Let E be an economy. A triple (x;ŷ; f ) 2 X Y V 0 is a valuation equilibrium (resp. valuation quasiequilibrium) for E i¤ (i) (x;ŷ) 2 A, (ii) f is non-zero and (iii) the implications
hold true for every (i; l) 2 M N .
6 Second welfare theorems 6.1 From Pareto optima to quasiequilibria Theorems 6 and 7 guarantee the supportability of Pareto optima as valuation quasiequilibria: both dispense with some usual convexity conditions. If attention is restricted to an economy with locally nonsatiated preference relations then Theorem 6 properly subsumes Theorem 2 in Debreu (1954) . Examples of economies where Theorem 6 applies will be shown in Sect. 8.
Theorem 6 Let E be a regular economy. Assume that:
If ( x; y) 2 X Y is a Pareto optimum then ( x; y; f ) is a valuation quasiequilibrium for a continuous f 2 V 0 that is nonnegative on C and positive on int(C).
Proof. Suppose ( x; y) 2 X Y is a Pareto optimum. Put
The nonemptiness ofÂ follows from the local nonsatiation of strict preference relations while that of B from the nonemptiness of productions sets. By the regularity of E, when V is not …nite-dimensional eitherÂ or B has nonempty interior; 8 thereforeÂ B has nonempty interior when V is not …nite-dimensional. By the Pareto optimality of ( x; y), the setsÂ and B are disjoint. Thus 9 Theorem 4 and Corollary 2 ensure the existence of a continuous linear functional f 2 V 0 separatingÂ and B which is nonnegative on C and positive on int(C). Aŝ A and B are separated by f 2 V 0 , there must exist 2 R and two intervals I = fr 2 R : r g and I = fr 2 R : r g such thatÂ
As f is continuous, the preimage K through f of the closed (in R) interval I is closed (in V ). As K is closed (in V ), Lemma 15 in Appendix B entails that A and B are separated by f . So f (a) f (b) for all (a; b) 2 A B and hence
As ( x; y) 2 A by the de…nition of a Pareto optimum, we have f ( x 1 + : : : + x m ) = f (! + y 1 + : : : + y n ).
As f is linear, from (12) and (13) we obtain
for all (x; y) 2 R( x) Y: therefore the two implications
hold true 10 as the Pareto optimum ( x; y) lies in R( x) Y by the re ‡exivity of R i for all i 2 M . We conclude that ( x; y; f ) is a valuation quasiequilibrium.
Conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem 6 entail that at least one consumer has a convex and C-upward strict preference relation. Condition 3 of Theorem 6 is evidently met when all production sets are decomposably C-antichain-convex and so one obtains the following immediate Corollary 3, whose proof is omitted.
Corollary 3 Let E be a regular economy. Assume that:
2. P i is convex and C-upward for at least one i 2 M ; 3. Y l is decomposably C-antichain-convex for all l 2 N .
We show a variant of Theorem 6 which neither implies nor is implied by it. By Corollary 1, the last two assumptions of Theorem 7 entail the convexity of the aggregate production set Y (though not necessarily that of each production set Y l ). The convexity of preference relations will not be assumed. Examples of economies where Theorem 7 applies will be shown in Sect. 8.
Theorem 7 Let E be a regular economy. Assume that:
2. Y l is convex and C-downward for at least one l 2 N ; 3. Y l is decomposably C-antichain-convex for all l 2 N .
Proof. Exactly 11 the same proof as that of Theorem 6.
From quasiequilibria to equilibria
We show su¢ cient conditions for a quasiequilibrium to be an equilibrium.
Proposition 8 Suppose E is an economy. Let f 2 V 0 and i 2 M be a consumer with a convex consumption set X i containing a consumption vector x i . Put i = inf f [X i ]. Suppose P i is D-lower semicontinuous and consider the implications
1. If f (x i ) > i then the validity of (15) implies the validity of (16). (16) is true.
Proof. 1. Assume that f (x i ) > i and that (15) is true. Then
for some x i 2 X i . The contrapositive of (15) entails that
and a fortiori that
Suppose for a moment that x i is an element of X i such that f (x i ) f (x i ): the convexity of X i , the linearity of f and inequality (17) imply that
From (18) and (19) we infer that ft 2 [0; 1] :
and so, by virtue of the D-lower semicontinuity of P i , we infer that
The contrapositive of (20) entails that (16) is true. 2. The immediate proof is omitted.
Corollary 4 Suppose E is a strictly regular economy with a valuation quasiequilibrium ( x; y; f ). (16) is true whenever i 2 M and x i = 0 by the irre ‡exivity of P i . When i 2 M and x i 6 = 0, the implication in (15) holds true because ( x; y; f ) is a quasiequilibrium: therefore (16) is true by virtue of part 1 of Proposition 8 (and by the positivity of f on X i nf0g).
Proposition 9 provides su¢ cient conditions only on the primitives of an economy E for a valuation quasiequilibrium to be a valuation equilibrium.
Proposition 9 Let E be a strictly regular economy. Suppose ( x; y; f ) is a valuation quasiequilibrium such that f 2 V 0 is nonnegative on C.
monotone for all i 2 M , and ! 2 int(C). Border (2006) ensures that f is positive on int(C). So part 1 of Proposition 9 is a direct consequence of part 2 of Corollary 4. 2. Suppose that X i C for all i 2 M and that P (x i ) int(X i ) for all x i 2 X i n int(X i ) and for all i 2 M . Lemma 5.66 in Aliprantis and Border (2006) ensures that f is positive on int(C) int(X i ) for all i 2 M . As f is vanishing at 0 2 X i and nonnegative on C X i for all i 2 M , we have that inf f [X i ] = 0. By assumption, (15) is true for all i 2 M . If i 2 M and f (x i ) > 0 then (16) is true by part 1 of Proposition 8 as (15) is true for all i 2 M . If instead i 2 M and f (x i ) = 0 then x i = 2 int(X i ) and using part 2 of Proposition 8 we can infer that (16) is true. In conclusion, (16) is true for all i 2 M and hence ( x; y; f ) is a valuation equilibrium.
Proof. 1. Lemma 5.66 in Aliprantis and
3. Suppose X i = C for all i 2 M , P i is C-monotone for all i 2 M , and ! 2 int(C). Lemma 5.66 in Aliprantis and Border (2006) ensures that f is positive on int(C). So
By the strict regularity of E each …rm can be inactive and hence
since in quasiequilibrium …rms maximize own pro…ts (namely, the implication in (11) must hold for all l 2 N ). As ( x; y) 2 A, we have 
As P i is C-monotone and x i 2 X i , we have x i + c 2 X i for all c 2 C and
As ( x; y; f ) is a valuation quasiequilibrium, the implication in (15) holds true for i = i and so from (23) and part 1 of Proposition 8 we infer that (16) holds true for i = i . This last fact, together with (24), entails that
As f is linear, (25) implies f (c) > 0 for all c 2 Cnf0g. Thus f is positive on X i nf0g = Cnf0g for all i 2 M and part 2 of Corollary 4 ensures that ( x; y; f ) is a valuation equilibrium.
7 Discussion of some assumptions
On antichain-convex preferences
Convexity of preferences is at times understood as an expression of the inclination of a consumer to diversi…cationnvariety: just to provide two references, see Mas-Colell et al. (1995, p. 44) and Villar (2000, p. 20) . This interpretation, however, might oversimplify the actual implications of convexity. Consider, for instance, the case of a preordered preference relation R de…ned on R 2 + and-for simplicity-suppose that R can be represented by a utility function u. If R is convex then the equality u(x ) = u(x ) implies u(x =2 + x =2) u(x ) = u(x ) for all consumption vectors x and x in R 2 + . When x and x cannot be compared under the usual product order relation for R 2 + -e.g., when x = (4; 0) and x = (0; 4)-the consumption vector x =2 + x =2 might be legitimately interpreted as a diversifying consumption vector. However, there is some doubt that x =2 + x =2 can be legitimately considered a diversifying vector when x and x can be compared. For instance, one might consider the consumption vectors x = (10; 10) and x = (30; 30) and wonder whether (20; 20) can be properly considered a diversifying consumption vector. The interpretation of the convexity of a preference relation as the consumer's inclination to diversi…cation appears as an oversimpli…cation: the condition of convexity is in fact more demanding. The introduction of the notion of a C-antichain-convex preference allows to express the inclination of a consumer to diversi…cation in a more precise and circumstantial form. For instance, if in the previous example R is assumed to be R 2 + -antichain-convex then the inclination of a consumer to diversi…cation is e¤ectively restricted to mixtures of consumption vectors that cannot be compared under the usual product order of R 2 + . So far we have considered a preordered preference relation, the interpretation of the C-antichain-convexity of the associated strict preference is analogous. Proposition 10-proved in Appendix B.1-shows that in the case of totally preordered relation the condition of C-antichain-convexity is even equivalent to that of the associated strict preference relation.
Proposition 10 Let E be an economy and i 2 M be a consumer with a Cantichain-convex consumption set X i . Suppose R i is totally preordered. Then P i is C-antichain-convex if and only if R i is C-antichain-convex.
On upward preferences and downward production sets
Like C-antichain-convex preference relations represent a circumstantial formulation of the notion of convexity, also the de…nitions of C-monotone and C-upward preference relations enunciated above allow circumstantial formulations of various notions of monotonicity. Propositions 11 and 12-proved in Appendix B.1-show how these de…nitions precisely relate one to each other.
Proposition 11
Let E be an economy and i 2 M be a consumer. If the preference relation R i is preordered then
Proposition 12 Let E be an economy and i 2 M be a consumer. If the preference relation R i is totally preordered then
When C is degenerate-i.e., when C f0g-the condition that a production set Y l is C-downward does not impose any actual requisite on the production set. When C is not degenerate, the condition that a production set Y l is Cdownward cannot be understood as a circumstantial formulation of the usual notion of free-disposability, at least in general.
12 Proposition 13-proved in Appendix B.1-shows a decomposition that allows us to have a clear economic interpretation of such a condition.
Proposition 13 Let E be an economy and l 2 N be a …rm: (i) C ? = C [ f0g is a cone; (ii) the production set Y l is C-downward if and only if
Economically, Proposition 13 says that the assumption that Y l is C-downward is equivalent to the assumption that the production Y l is invariant under the addition of the constant returns to scale technology C ? = C [ f0g.
On antichain-convex production sets
When inaction is possible, a known implication of convexity are non-increasing returns to scale. While the possibility of inaction can seem reasonable in several contexts, non-increasing returns to scale need not in many cases: just to provide two references, see Kreps (1990, pp. 235-236) and Villar (2000, Sect. 3.4) . The C-antichain-convexity of a production set does not generally imply nonincreasing returns to scale even when inaction is possible. Being a circumstantial form of convexity, C-antichain-convexity requires the production feasibility only of some mixtures of two feasible activities (in fact C-antichain-convexity is compatible even with discrete production sets and hence with indivisibilities).
On decomposably antichain-convex production sets
A decomposition fY 
Following Debreu (1951, pp. 277-278) , we can suppose that the aggregate production set is the sum of the activity possibility sets-each activity possibility set formally de…ned as a subset of V -of the production units of the economy: a production unit does not necessarily coincide with a …rm. The assumption that Y l is decomposably C-antichain-convex can be interpreted as the assumption that …rm l is made up of k production units-e.g., its plants-with C-antichain-convex activity possibility sets whose sum Y The interpretation of the C-antichain-convexity of an activity possibility set is analogous to that of a C-antichain-convex production set.
On lower semicontinuous preferences
The notion of a lower semicontinuous preference-paralleling that of a lower semicontinuous (utility) function-requires the openness of strictly preferred sets. The literature, however, has employed also some nonequivalent variants.
De…nition 12 Let E be an economy and i 2 M be a consumer. Put
for all (x i ; x i ) 2 X i X i and endow I(x i ; x i ) and X i with, respectively, the relative topology from R and V . The strict preference relation P i is:
Proposition 14-proved in Appendix B.1-relates the various de…nitions of semicontinuity introduced sofar. Proposition 14 Let E be an economy and i 2 M be a consumer.
1. If P i is lower semicontinuous then P i is D-lower * semicontinuous.
2. If P i is D-lower * semicontinuous then P i is D-lower semicontinuous.
Condition III in Debreu (1954) implies D-lower * semicontinuity (and so even D-lower semicontinuity by virtue of Proposition 14): this can be readily checked recalling that in Debreu (1954) preference relations are total preorders.
Numerical examples
We show seven economies satisfying the assumptions of either Theorem 7 or Corollary 3 (and hence of Theorem 6) whose set of valuation quasiequilibria coincides with that of valuation equilibria by virtue of Proposition 9.
Remark 4
We a¢ rm now, once for all, that in Examples 2-8 every P i is Cantichain-convex for any cone C such that R + C R by virtue of Proposition 16 and either Examples 9 or 11: see Appendix C. Also, in Examples 2-8 a direction is indicated along which utility functions are strictly increasing: the local nonsatiation of P i is immediately veri…ed considering such a direction.
Before introducing the seven economies, it is worth to remark that for each of them the existence of a Pareto optimum-which, however, is not the object of our inquiry-obtains from known results of the literature. 
"Specialized" economies with non-convexities
Examples of "specialized" economies are shown where each commodity can be produced by exactly one …rm and where each …rm can produce exactly one commodity. The examples are of interest because-despite the convexity of the aggregate production set-one of the (two) commodities of the economy can be produced only by means of a non-convex technology.
Example 2 Let E be an economy with two consumers and two …rms. Let the commodity space V coincide with R 2 , let each consumption set X i equal R 2 + and let each preference relation R i be represented by a continuous utility function u i strictly increasing at all v 2 R 2 + along (1; 1).
14 In particular, suppose that
with A = f( a; a) : a = 0; 1; 2; 3; 4g. 1 3 In all our examples the boundedness of the attainable set A is a consequence of Theorem 12.3 in Villar (2000) . Noted this, one readily veri…es the nonemptiness and the compactness of the attainable set; the existence of a Pareto optimum is then guaranteed by representability of preference relations by means of continuous utility functions. 1 4 I.e., for all v 2 R 2 + the map R + ! R de…ned by 7 ! u i (v + (1; 1) ) is strictly increasing. Fig. 1 The sets C, Y 1 and Y 2 of Examples 2 and 3.
It is not di¢ cult to verify that A is coni(T )-antichain-convex and it is immediate that R 2 is convex (and hence a fortiori coni(T )-antichain-convex): we can conclude that Y 2 is decomposably coni(T )-antichain-convex. Clearly, Y 1 is coni(T )-downward and convex (and hence a fortiori decomposably coni(T )-antichain-convex). Noted this, one can readily verify that all conditions of Theorem 7 are satis…ed. Also, one can readily verify that also the conditions of part 2 of Proposition 9 are satis…ed. Example 3 Exactly the same economy illustrated in Example 2, but now let preference relations be representable by
The continuous utility functions u 1 and u 2 keep on being strictly increasing at all v 2 R 2 + along (1; 1) but they are not quasiconcave anymore: see Remark 6. Even though preferences now are non-convex, the economy continues to satisfy all conditions of Theorem 7. One can readily verify that also the conditions of part 2 of Proposition 9 continue to be satis…ed.
Example 4
Exactly the same economy illustrated in Example 3, but now put Y 2 = A (where A is the discrete set de…ned in Example 2).
"Unspecialized" economies with non-convexities
Here we show two examples of "unspecialized"economies where any commodity can be produced by any …rm. Fig. 3 The sets C, Y 1 and Y 2 of Examples 5 and 6.
Example 5 Let E be an economy with two consumers and two …rms. Let the commodity space V coincide with R 2 , let each consumption set X i equal R It is not di¢ cult to verify that A is coni(T )-antichain-convex and it is immediate that co(B) and R 2 are convex (and hence a fortiori coni(T )-antichainconvex): we can conclude that Y 2 is decomposably coni(T )-antichain-convex. Clearly, Y 1 is coni(T )-downward and convex (and hence a fortiori decomposably coni(T )-antichain-convex). Noted this, one can readily verify that all conditions of Theorem 7 are satis…ed. Also, one can readily verify that also the conditions of part 1 of Proposition 9 are satis…ed in Example 5. Fig. 4 Upper level sets of u 1 and u 2 in Example 6.
Example 6 Exactly the same economy illustrated in Example 5, but now let preference relations be representable by
The continuous utility functions u 1 and u 2 keep on being strictly increasing in the second argument but they are not quasiconcave anymore: see Remark 5. Even though preferences now are non-convex, the economy continues to satisfy all conditions of Theorem 7. One can readily verify that also the conditions of part 1 of Proposition 9 continue to be satis…ed.
Economies with non-convex aggregate production sets
In all previous examples the aggregate production set was convex. Here we show two examples of economies where aggregate production set is non-convex. Example 7 Let E be an economy with four consumers and two …rms. Let the commodity space V coincide with R 2 , let each consumption set X i equal R 2 + and let each preference relation R i be represented by a continuous utility function u i strictly increasing at all v 2 R 2 + along (1; 1). In particular, suppose that Besides assume ! 1 = ! 2 = (3; 0) and ! 3 = ! 4 = (0; 3).
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It is not di¢ cult to verify that A is R 2 + -antichain-convex and it is immediate that coni(B) is convex (and hence a fortiori R Example 8 Exactly the same economy illustrated in Example 7 but now remove the assumption that ! 1 = ! 2 = (3; 0) and ! 3 = ! 4 = (0; 3) and suppose that Fig. 2 for a graphical representation of u 1 and u 2 ).
The continuous utility functions u 1 ,u 2 , u 3 and u 4 keep on being strictly increasing at all v 2 R 2 + along (1; 1) but they are not quasiconcave anymore: see Remark 6. Even though some preferences now are non-convex, the economy continues to satisfy all conditions of Theorem 6 (note that P 3 and P 4 continue to be R 2 + -upward). One can readily verify that now the conditions of part 2 of Proposition 9 are satis…ed.
In both cases C is a cone.
Only if part. Suppose C is a cone. Then (x; ) 2 (C [ f0g) R ++ implies x 2 C [ f0g (when x 2 C because C is a cone and when x = 0 because x = 0). So C [ f0g is a cone.
2. It su¢ ces to prove the if part since C = ( C). Such a proof is as follows. Suppose C is a cone. Then (x; ) 2 C R ++ implies ( x; ) 2 C R ++ and hence x belongs to the cone C: this implies x 2 C. So C is a cone. 3. It su¢ ces to prove the if part since C = (C). Such a proof is as follows. Suppose C is a cone. Then (x; ) 2 C R ++ implies x = 2 C and hence x does not belong 15 to the cone C: this implies x 2 C. So C is a cone. 4. Suppose C is a cone. The set C is a cone by part 2 of Lemma 1. Let be an arbitrary positive real. If x 2 C [ C then x belongs to either the cone C or the cone C and hence x 2 C [ C. Thus C [ C is a cone.
5. A consequence of parts 3-4 of Lemma 1.
A.2 On C-chain-convex sets Lemma 2 Let V be a RVS, C be a cone in V and S be a subset of V . S by the C-chain-convexity of S. In both cases implication (26) is true.
S is C-chain-convex if and only if
2. Implication (2) is readily seen to be equivalent to the implication
and hence also to implication (27).
Lemma 3 Let V be a RVS, C be a cone in V and S be a subset of V .
1. S is C-chain-convex if and only if S is C [ f0g-chain-convex.
2. S is C-antichain-convex if and only if S is C [ f0g-antichain-convex. 5. The if part is an immediate consequence of the only if part and of the equality ( S) = S. We prove just the only if part, as follows. Assume that S is C-chain-convex. By way of contradiction, suppose S is not C-chainconvex; then part 1 of Lemma 2 implies the existence of a triple (x; y; ) in S S [0; 1] such that y x 2 C [ C and x h i y = 2 S. So, puttinĝ x = x andŷ = y, we equivalently have that (x;ŷ; ) 2 S S [0; 1] , y x 2 C [ C andx h iŷ = 2 S: a contradiction with the assumption that S is C-chain-convex and with part 1 of Lemma 2.
6. Essentially the same proof of part 5: just replace "C-chain-convex" with "C-antichain-convex", "part 1"with "part 2", "y x 2 C [ C"with "y x = 2 C [ C" and "ŷ x 2 C [ C" with "ŷ x = 2 C [ C".
Proof of Proposition 1. 
Thus S is C-chain-convex if and only if
and therefore-by virtue of De…nition 1-it readily follows that S is C-chainconvex if and only if S is C [ C-antichain-convex. 2. Part 5 of Lemma 1 ensures that C [ C is a cone. Put
The C -chain-convexity of S is equivalent to the C -antichain-convexity of S by part 1 of Proposition 1 and hence also to the C [ C-antichain-convexity of S because C = C [ C by (29) . The C [ C-antichain-convexity of S is equivalent to the C-antichain-convexity of S by part 4 of Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 2. A consequence of parts 1-2 of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose S is C-antichain-convex. Note that f0g is C-antichain-convex and f0g + S = S. Conclude that S is decomposably C-antichain-convex.
A.3 On C-upward sets Lemma 4 Let V be a RVS, C be a cone in V and S be a subset of V .
S is C-upward implies y 2 S. Thus y 2 S + C implies y 2 S and we conclude that S + C S.
2. By part 4 of Lemma 4, S is C-downward if and only if S is C-upward. By part 1 of Lemma 5, S is C-upward if and only if S + C S. As the inclusion S + C S is true if and only if so is the inclusion S C S, we conclude that S is C-downward if and only if S C S.
3. Note that S + C S as 0 2 C. Noted this, part 3 of Lemma 5 is an immediate consequence of part 1 of Lemma 5.
4. Note that 0 2 C and that S C S as 0 2 C. Noted this, part 4 of Lemma 5 is an immediate consequence of part 2 of Lemma 5.
Proof of Proposition 5. 1. Suppose S is C-upward. Let (x; y; ) 2 S S [0; 1] and y x 2 C. When = 1 we have that x h i y = y 2 S by assumption. Henceforth suppose 6 = 1. Then (1 )(y x) 2 C because C is a cone. As S is a C-upward set containing x, we infer that x + (1 )(y x) 2 S. Noting that x h i y = x + (1 )(y x), we conclude that x h i y 2 S and hence that S is C-chain-convex.
2. Analogous to the proof of part 1 of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 7. 1. Suppose X is C-upward. Then X + C X by part 1 of Lemma 5. So (X + Y ) + C = (X + C) + Y X + Y by basic properties of Minkowski addition and part 1 of Lemma 5 ensures that X + Y is C-upward.
2. Suppose X is C-downward. Then X is C-upward by part 4 of Lemma 4. As also Y is a subset of V , part 1 of Proposition 7 ensures that X Y is C-upward. So X + Y is C-downward by part 4 of Lemma 4.
B Some economic facts B.1 On preferences and production sets Lemma 6 Let E be an economy and i 2 M be a consumer. Assume that R i is transitive and x i 2 X i .
. Suppose P i (x i ) 6 = ; and pick an arbitrary v 2 P i (x i ). Then v 2 R i (x i ) and
As v 2 R i (x i ) and x i 2 R i (x i ), the transitivity of
2. A consequence of part 1 of Lemma 6. 3. Assume that x i 2 R i (x i ) and x i 2 R i (x i ) and that either x i 2 P i (x i ) or x i 2 P i (x i ). Then at least one of the following two exhaustive cases is true.
. Part 2 of Lemma 6 ensures the validity of the equality P i (
Proof of Proposition 10. If part. Suppose R i is C-antichain-convex and x i 2 X i . Assume that
The totality of R i entails that either
Only if part. Suppose P i is C-antichain-convex and x i 2 X i . Assume that
By way of contradiction, suppose x i h i x i = 2 R i (x i ): the totality of R i implies x i 2 P i (x i h i x i ). As x i 2 R i (x i ) and x i 2 P i (x i h i x i ), part 3 of Lemma 6 ensures that x i 2 P i (x i h i x i ); as x i 2 R i (x i ) and x i 2 P i (x i h i x i ), part 3 of Lemma 6 ensures that x i 2 P i (x i h i x i ). So x i 2 P i (x i h i x i ) and x i 2 P i (x i h i x i ) and hence x i h i x i 2 P i (x i h i x i ) by the C-antichain-convexity of P i : a contradiction with the irre ‡exivity of P i .
Lemma 7 Let E be an economy and i 2 M be a consumer. If P i is C-monotone then R i is C-monotone.
Proof. Suppose P i is C-monotone. Then the implication
Lemma 8 Let E be an economy and i 2 M be a consumer. Suppose R i is transitive. If R i is C-monotone then P i is C-upward.
Proof. Suppose R i is C-monotone. Assume that x i 2 X i , that
and that x i is an element of V such that x i x i 2 C: we are done if we show
Henceforth suppose x i 6 = x i . Then x i x i 2 Cnf0g and the C-monotonicity of R i entails that
Then (33) and (31) imply (32) by virtue of part 3 of Lemma 6.
Lemma 9 Let E be an economy and i 2 M be a consumer. Suppose R i is re ‡exive. If R i is C-upward then R i is C-monotone.
Proof. Suppose R i is C-upward. Assume that (x i ; x i ) 2 X i V and that x i x i 2 Cnf0g: we are done if we show
is a C-upward set containing x i and x i x i 2 Cnf0g.
Lemma 10 Let E be an economy and i 2 M be a consumer. Suppose R i is transitive. If R i is C-monotone then R i is C-upward.
.
Henceforth suppose x i 6 = x i . Then
Lemma 11 Let E be an economy and i 2 M be a consumer. Suppose R i is total. If P i is C-upward then R i is C-monotone.
Proof. Suppose P i is C-upward. Assume that (x i ; x i ) 2 X i V and that x i x i 2 Cnf0g: we are done if we show
) by the totality of R i : but this yields a contradiction with the irre ‡exivity of P i as (x i ; x i ) 2 X i V , x i 2 P i (x i ), x i x i 2 Cnf0g and the assumption that P i is C-upward imply x i 2 P i (x i ). So (35) is true.
Proof of Proposition 11. Suppose R i is preordered. The C-monotonicity of P i implies that of R i by Lemma 7 and so the …rst one-way implication is true. The validity of the double implication is guaranteed by Lemmas 9 and 10. Furthermore, such a double implication and Lemma 8 guarantees the validity of the remaining one-way implication.
Proof of Proposition 12. An immediate consequence of Lemma 11 and Proposition 11. 
B.2 On half-space inclusion of aggregate preferred sets
Lemma 12 Let E be an economy and i 2 M be a consumer. Assume that P i is locally nonsatiated and that K is a closed subset of V . If x i 2 X i and
Proof. Suppose x i 2 X i and P i (x i ) K. As P i is locally nonsatiated, the intersection P i (x i ) \ U is nonempty for every neighborhood U of x i . Pick x U i in P i (x i ) \ U for every neighborhood U of x i . As P i (x i ) K and x U i 2 P i (x i ) \ U for every neighborhood U of x i , we have that x U i 2 K \U for every neighborhood U of x i . We conclude that x i is a limit point for K. So x i 2 K as every closed set contains its limit points.
Lemma 13 Let E be an economy and i 2 M be a consumer. Assume that P i is locally nonsatiated and transitive and that K is a closed subset of V . If x i 2 X i and P i (x i ) K then R i (x i ) K.
Proof. Suppose x i 2 X i and P i (x i ) K. As P i (x i ) R i (x i ), the local nonsatiation of P i ensures that R i (x i ) 6 = ;. Pick x i 2 R i (x i ). As P i (x i ) K,
Suppose for a moment that x i = 2 P i (x i ). As x i = 2 P i (x i ) and x i 2 R i (x i ), we have x i 2 R i (x i ). So x i 2 R i (x i ) and x i 2 R i (x i ) and part 2 of Lemma 6 implies P i (x i ) = P i (x i ). Therefore P i (x i ) K and from Lemma 12 we infer that x i 2 K. In conclusion,
From (36) and (37) we conclude that the arbitrary element x i of R i (x i ) is also an element of K. So R i (x i ) K.
Lemma 14 Let E be an economy and i 2 M be a consumer. Assume that R i transitive, that P i is locally nonsatiated and that K is a closed subset of V . Suppose Q V is an arbitrary subset of the commodity space and x i is an element of X i . If P i (x i ) + Q K then R i (x i ) + Q K.
Proof. Suppose P i (x i ) + Q K. If Q = ; then ; = R i (x i ) + Q K and there is nothing to prove. Assume that Q 6 = ; and pick an arbitrary q 2 Q. Then P i (x i ) + q K and hence P i (x i ) q + K:
As K is closed in V , then so is q + K. As q + K is closed, inclusion (38) implies R i (x i ) q + K by Lemma 13. Consequently R i (x i ) + q K. Being q arbitrary in Q, we conclude that R i (x i ) + Q K also when Q 6 = ;.
Lemma 15 Let E be an economy. Assume that R 1 ,. . . ,R m are transitive, that P 1 ,. . . ,P m are locally nonsatiated and that K is a closed subset of V and that x 2 X . Then P 1 (x 1 ) + : : : + P m (x m ) K ) R 1 (x 1 ) + : : : + R m (x m ) K.
Proof. If m = 1 then the validity of Lemma 15 is ensured by Lemma 13. Henceforth assume that m > 1 and that P 1 (x 1 ) + : : : + P m (x m ) K.
Case m = 2. Inclusion (39) and Lemma 14 imply that R 1 (x 1 ) + P 2 (x 2 ) K (to check the implication identify P 2 (x 2 ) with Q). The previous inclusion and Lemma 14 imply that R 1 (x 1 ) + R 2 (x 2 ) K (to check the implication identify R 1 (x 1 ) with Q).
Case m > 2. Put Q 1 = P 2 (x 2 ) + : : : + P m (x m ) and Q m = R 1 (x 1 ) + : : : + R m 1 (x m 1 ) and for every integer k 2 f2; : : : ; m 1g put
Inclusion (39) and Lemma 14 imply Q 1 + R 1 (x 1 ) K. The previous inclusion and Lemma 14 imply Q 2 + R 2 (x 2 ) K and reiterating this type of reasoning we get Q m + R m (x m ) K. As 
C On antichain-quasiconcavity
Constructing C-antichain-convex and decomposably C-antichain-convex sets is quite simple. Constructing examples of strict preference relations which are Cantichain-convex might at …rst appear not so elementary when we require them to be also non-convex. The end of this Sect. 5 is dedicated to the illustration of two simple methods of constructing non-trivial non-convex C-antichain-convex preference. To this end, we introduce some de…nitions which generalize to arbitrary real vector spaces and cones analogous notions of generalized convexity already introduced in Ceparano and Quartieri (2017) .
